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ABSTRAK 
PROTOKOL PERMAINAN KAD MENTAL YANG MENYOKONG 
KESERBAGUNAAN, KETEGUHAN DAN KECEKAPAN 
f Pennainan kad mental merupakan protokol kriptografi yang membolehkan pennainan yang 
~ 
disahkan adil di kalangan parti-parti jauh yang penyangsi dan berpotensi menipu. Pennainan 
kad ini setidak-tidaknya patut menyokong-tanpa memperkenal~an parti ketiga yang dipercayai 
(TTP)--rahsia kad, pengesanan penipuan dan keselamatan bersyarat ke atas pakatan pemain. 
Tambahan kepada keperJuan asas ini, kami meninjau isu-isu pennainan kad mental yang 
berkaitan dengan fungsian permainan, keteguhan operasional dan kecekapan implementasi. 
Pengkajian kami diberangsang oleh potensi pennainan berasaskan komputer dan rangkaian yang 
melewati batas kemampuan kad fizikal, terutamanya pembongkaran maklumat terperinci kad 
(seperti warna, darjat, simbol atau kebangsawanan) sambi I merahsiakan nilai keseluruhan kad 
tersebut. Namun, perangkaian menyasarkan protokol kepada serangan penyahsambungan (sarna 
ada diniatkan mahupun tidak), dan tipu mu~lihat yang lain. Oleh itu, keteguhan operasional 
adalah intrinsik kepada pennainan kad mental yang praktikal, membenarkan pennainan berakhir 
dengan sempurna oleh suatu ambang pemain yang jujur. Kecekapan pengkomputan tidak 
kurang kepentingannya, memandangkan kesulitan-akibat daripada perseteruan di kalangan 
pemain dan the ketidakhadiran TTP--dalam memastikan kerahsiaan sifat rawak yang 
merupakan teras kepada permainan seumpama ini. 
Tesis ini membentangkan suatu skema permainan kad mental yang selamat dan adil dengan 
menggunakan kad bercirikan atribut, yang mana keselamatan berlandaskan kriptosistem 
homomorfik and probabilistik, keteguhan menerusi mekanisme perkongsian rahsia ambang 
x 
yang berdasarkan polinomial, dan pengocokan kad yang cekap berteraskan rangkaian pilihatur 
bersaiz arbitrari (AS PN). Deskripsi bercirikan atribut merealisasikan pembongkaran atribut 
.. (dan bukan kad) yang mustahil dalam permainan fizikal; struktur datanya yang fleksibel 
,. mendorong keserbagunaan permainan. Dalam pada itu, keselamatan pada bihap protokol 
[bergantung kepada kriptosistem logaritma diskret dan kriptografi ambang. Kedua-dua .ini 
;>. 
t.~.~ 
~: diintegrasikan dalam operasi-operasi lazim seperti membancuh, mendapatkan atau memberi 
~ .. 
~·kad, dan pembongkaran atribut kad. Keteguhan permainan berasas ambang juga menyumbang 
i 
: kepada toleransi terhadap sebilangan kecil penyelewengan protokol (umpamanya pakatan haram 
serta keguguran pemain). Kami memajukan operasi yang paling memakan kuasa 
pengkomputan, yakni pengocokan kad, dengan menyusulkan suatu pengoptimuman ke atas AS 
PN, dan mengadunkan struktur minimum suatu rangkaian-aduk berteraskan PN dengan 
kecekapan pengkomputan pada tahap suis, yang amat menarik dari segi operasi praktikalnya. 
Protokol kami mencapai kecekapan O( '711 IW) bagi input bersais 11 and pemain sebanyak '7, 
berbandingkan O(KTfI1) bagi penyelesaian yang sedia-ada, dengan 1( sebagai parameter 
keselamatan. 
XI 
ABSTRACT 
~. 
Mental card games are cryptographic protocols which permit verifiably fair gameplay among a 
l< 
~. 
priori distrustful and potentially untrustworthy remote parties and should minimally provide-
without the introduction of a trusted third party (TTP)---for card confidentiality, fraud detection 
and conditional security against collusion. In addition to these basic requirements, we explore 
into gameplay functionality, operational robustness and implementation efficiency issues of 
mental card gaming. Our research is incited by the potential of computer-based and network-
mediated gameplay beyond the capability of physical cards, particularly fine-grained 
information disclosure (such as colour, rank, symbol or courtliness) with preservation of card 
secrecy. On the other hand, being network connected renders the protocol susceptible to 
(accidental or intentional) disconnection attack, as well as other malicious behaviours. 
Operational robustness is therefore intrinsic to practical mental card gaming, allowing the 
completion of game by a configurable threshold of trustworthy players. Computational 
efficiency is no less important, considering the difficulties-due to the adversarial players and 
the absence of a TTP--of ensuring secret randomisation at the heart of these games of chance. 
This thesis presents a secure and fair mental card gaming scheme, featuring attribute-based 
cards, with security predicated on homomorphic probabilistic cryptosystem, robustness via 
polynomial-based threshold secret sharing mechanisms and efficient shuffling underpinned by 
arbitrary-sized (AS) permutation networks (PN). The attribute-based description realises 
physically impossible attribute (as opposed card) disclosure; its flexible data structure promotes 
gameplay versatility. Meanwhile, protocol-level security is reliant on discrete logarithmic 
cryptosystem and threshold cryptography, both of which are integrated into commonly 
XII 
encountered operations such as shuffling, drawing or giving cards, and card-attribute disclosure. 
The inherent threshold-based gameplay robustness also provides tolerance against a minority of 
o' protocol deviation (such as collusion and player dropouts). We improve on the most 
~ computation-expensive operation, which is card shuffling by proposing an optimisation on an 
I'· AS PN, and incorporating structural minimisation of a PN-based mix-net with switch-level ; computation efficiency. which is of interest from the viewpoint of practical operability. Our I protocol achieves O( 7]f.lIgf.l) efficiency for f.l inputs and 7] players, compared to O( K77f.l), with 1( 
~: being the security parameter, of existing solution. 
~: 
XIII 
..... ;. 
Chapter 1 
INTRODUCTION 
Online Gaming 
connectivity as the medium for high value transactions provides a substantive 
motivation for gaming companies. According to New York worldwide investment banking firm 
j'. Bear, Steams & Co. Inc., 'there is·an estimafe of 1700 virtual gaming sites on the internet. Even 
~ 
~: 
~, 
with the current problem of major credit c3.rd companies rejecting online gaming transactions, 
~ . 
still, $4.2 billion in revenues was projected by Bear Steams for 2003, pared down from a 
previous growth forecast of $5 billion (Ader, 2001; Bear, Steams & Co. Inc., 2002). Besides 
credit card problem, other major impediments are the questionable security of private 
information, fairness of online games and trust in the gaming site operators. 
In physical gaming environment, players can scrutinise the exchange of physical tokens or 
money to ensure correctness, but not in onli?e gaming. Devoid of face-to-face contact, players 
need to be reassured of the privacy of personal information (such as credit card number), 
security of gaming transactions (such as betting, payoffs) and fairness of gaming operations 
(such as card shuffling, dice rolling, random number generation). These requirements demand 
protocols that, at least, endorse secure online payment, commitment of actions, verifiability or 
audit trail. In addition, the gaming solution should be robust to handle disconnections--either 
voluntary interruption by players or a simple network breakdown. However, the manifestation 
of security in the current gaming environment usually just revolves around payment. 
conventional gammg solutions--casino softwares developed by leading suppliers such as 
StarTlet, Boss Media, Cryptologic and Microgaming-rely on the existence of a trusted third 
partY (ITP), or the dealer, to facilitate gameplay. This TTP would then possess knowledge of 
. the game-state, which provides an unfair advantage to the site operator and also renders it an 
':"'H~(·t",'f> target for subversion. TTP-centred protocols would therefore not be satisfactory to a 
distrustful players and are furthermore insufficiently generic. Such protocols would, for 
example, not be useful for gam~s in which the site operator is also an active participant. One 
. approach applied in recent software by SCYTL (2002) is to reduce the amount of trust on the 
site operator by supporting multiparty computation for random events (like card shuffling, dice 
casting), such that these results are only obtainable with the consent of all involved parties. 
J However, this gives rise to the concern of information availability in the event of discon~ection. 
FJ; 
[;:~ 
~ .. 
~~ 
This thesis explores the online gaming issues from the perspective of fair game playing, in 
particular protocols required to support card games-usually referred to as mental card game 
protocols. To circumvent the issue of trust, we divert from the regular client-server framework 
to a peer-to-peer environment, without assuming any trusted dealer or operator. Thus, this 
necessitates protocols that enable a high degree of transactional versatility, security, reliability 
and efficiency. 
1.2 Mental Card Gaming 
Mental card game is a classic problem where cryptography can be fruitfully applied. The notion 
of security within mental card gaming context would need to address: 
• Self-etiforcement: without unconditional dependence on a TTP, in either the actual protocol 
or any adjudication after the completion of the protocol. 
• Cheat resistance: so that attempts are straightforwardly discovered. 
• Privacy: of a player's hand, the common deck, as well as the player's strategy. 
2 
• 
Collusion resistance: whereby no useful information can be gained about the other players' 
secrets than what can be inferred from the knowledge of the collusion. l~ ~ . Operational robustness: against dropped sessions or sore loser behaviours. 
~. Meanwhile, viability of the mechanisms and protocols for the intenet or wireless (such as 
'~~ mobile network) setting should consider: 
Computational feasibility: for implementation on devices of varying computing capabilities. 
• Functional versatility: in order to be broadly applicable to a wide range of card games, even 
to the extent of enabling operations impossible in physical gameplay. 
;. The first four security properties are generally considered to be the universal requirements in 
our area of interest. Thus, we present our research into mental card gaming among distrustful 
and potentially untrustworthy players, exploring gameplay functionality, operational robustness 
and implementation efficiency issues, while ensuring operational fairness (which concerns card 
confidentiality and fraud detection): 
• Gameplay functionality: We note that mental gaming-without presumption on player 
trustworthiness-is probably always going to result in algorithmically complex and 
computationally expensive protocols. Our motivation therefore stems from the potential of 
computer-based and network-mediated gameplay impossible (or at least highly impractical) 
with physical cards, in particular, configurable information disclosure (of colour, rank, 
symbol or courtliness) without divulging the entire card. 
• Operational robustness: The dependence on distributed computation-rather than player 
localisation at a gaming table-does, however, raise the issues of protocol hazards related to 
player errors, malicious behaviours (such as collusion or frauds due to unfavourable cards) 
or even simple network disconnection (be it accidental or otherwise). Practical mental 
3 
gaming must therefore be fault-tolerance, usually implemented via polynomial-based secret 
sharing (SS) techniques (Blakley, 1979; Shamir, 1979), thereby allowing game completion 
conditional on a threshold of honest players. 
Implementation efficiency: Computational efficiency is no less important, particularly given 
the varied computing powers of the players and the emergence of mobile gaming. This 
effort is especially focussed on shuffling operation due to its complexity. 
mention earlier, the absence of a trusted dealer results in the formulation of complex and 
· compute-intensive protocols, which is aggravated for card shuffling, as it requires the deck to be 
. 
• composed of every player's shuffled output for maximum fairness. Earlier approaches to mental 
· card gaming (Goldwasser & Micali, 1982; Crepeau, 1986, 1987; Schindelhauer, 1998) have 
been too computationally heavy to satisfy viability due to usage of bitwise encryption based on 
quadratic residuosity (QR) computation, which incurs logarithmic message expansion. Although 
in those schemes card shuffling is a simple protocol for every player to sequentially apply a 
private random permutation to the set of cards, it is unfortunately coupled with expensive zero-
knowledge proofs (ZKP) to verify correctness of the player's behaviour. Furthermore, in 
attempt to preclude collusion, Crepeau (1986, 1987) and Schindelhauer (1998) permit recovery 
of card only with cooperation by all players, which is operationally fragile depending on players 
not resorting to sore loser behaviour like dropping-out, and the reliability of network 
connection. 
Nevertheless, the QR computation can be extended to higher order (rth) residues (Kurosawa et 
al., 1990; Benaloh, 1994), thereby enabling more efficient wordwise encryption. This approach 
is implemented by Kurosawa et al. (1997), who also introduced the notion of gameplay 
robustness via Benaloh (1986) verifiable SS (VSS) with a threshold selected for tolerance 
against both collusion and dropouts. Shuffling, in their scheme, adopts mix-net mechanism of 
Ogata et al. (1997) such that the input-output correspondence IS obscured even to parties 
4 
involved in the mixing. However, the required VSS on every card as well as intermediate values 
would still result in high overheads on storage and computation. 
We propose a secure and robust mental gaming scheme with attribute-based cards, inspired by 
(1998) binary card representation, in which security is predicated on 
probabilistic cryptosystem based on discrete logarithm (DL) (EIGamal, 1985), 
and robustness via polynomial-based threshold SS (Shamir, 1979). Our formulation facilitates 
various operations such as card shuffling, drawing, transfer and card-attribute disclosure, the 
. last of which is a distinctive feature of our attribute-based card representation. Card shuffling, 
the most compute-expensive operation by a wide margin, is given special attention. For efficient 
J implementation, we employ robust mix-net mechanism (Abe, 1999; Jakobsson & Juels 1999; 
~. Abe & Hoshmo, 2001) wIth arbItrary-sIzed (AS) permutatIOn network (PN) (Chang & Melham, 
,..-
1997), so as to minimise the resultant overhead while still maintaining a high degree of 
operational robustness (Soo & Samsudin, 2002; Soo et al., 2002). 
5 
"{." 
~. 
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1.3 Thesis Contributions 
1.3.1 Problem Statement 
Based on the cursory overview of existing mental card gammg schemes as presented in 
Table 1.1, we conclude that the hitherto most complete and efficient solution is Kurosawa et al. 
(1997). However, the scheme still suffers a few shortcomings, which provides the motivation 
for our research work: 
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• 
Inappropriate encryption algorithm: Employment of wordwise encryption based on the 
,;: 
~ 
,< difficulty of rth residuosity problem (where r is a prime) does gain much performance 
improvement from the previous QR bitwise computation. However, due to r being reliant on 
.. the number of cards in play-thereby resulting in an r ~ 53 for a standard deck-the 
., 
corresponding decryption complexity of OCr) becomes impractical as r grows (for example 
in cases where a double-deck is in play). 
,- • Ineffective robustness support: The scheme allows completion of game--ensuring 
correctness of outcome-under the presence of a minority of faulty players, which is 
achieved via distribution of representative cryptographic parameters (or card information) 
~-.-
among the players, such that reconstruction of card is possible conditional on a threshold of 
t active honest players. Unfortunately, such SS incurs heavy computation, communication 
and storage, for generating, transferring and keeping each card-dependant secret-shares 
respectively; the worst-case scenario being card shuffling, which involves processing the 
whole deck of f.1 cards. 
• Inefficient shuffling operation: Based on Ogata et al. (1997) robust verifiable mix-net 
mechanism, its efficiency is however decreased by the underlying cryptosystem and the 
sharing of every card. Coupled with its' associated interactive correctness proofs, which 
computation and communication needs are logarithmic in the length of the security 
parameter 1(, the operation suffers O( KTJf.1) cost for an error probability of T"', 1] players and 
a deck of f.1 cards. 
• In extensible gameplay: Computer-based gaming is interesting in that it allows game tokens 
that cannot physically exist or, in other words, execution of familiar games in a manner 
impossible with physical cards. This results from implicit predication of gameplay on card 
representation. A simple set of { I, 2, ... , 52} for the standard deck is insufficient to express 
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a card, unlike the later formulation by Schindelhauer (1998) featuring binary card 
representation that enables bit level information disclosure, via a glue-and-separate 
operation. Schindelhauer, however, does not provide details on verifiability of the operation. 
Infeasible correctness proving: Usage of interactive proof techniques (Goldwasser et at., 
1985)-via a series of questions and answers-to assert the correctness of the gaming 
protocols can convince the verifier with overwhelming probability, but at the expense of 
high bandwidth consumption. Specifically, for a negligible failure probability of O(T,), the 
prover would have to engage in 1( conversations with the verifier. Thus, the resultant proof 
system requires a very high round complexity. What is more, due to the need for interaction, 
validity of the proof does not extend beyond the players, thus the proof does not convince 
external verifiers such as the bank. 
Table 1.1: Brief survey of existing solutions 
Scheme 
Shamir et al. 
(1979) 
Goldwasser & 
Micali (1982) 
Crepeau (1987) 
Kurosawa et al. 
(1990, 1997) 
Schindelhauer 
(1998) 
Improvements 
First mental poker 
Secure mental poker for multiplayer 
Complete mental poker supporting 
confidentiality of player's strategy 
Robust mental poker/card game with 
efficient wordwise encryption and 
configurable operational robustness 
Extended mental card gaming 
functionality based on binary card 
representation 
1.3.2 Proposed Solution 
Limitations 
2-player only 
Leakage of partial information 
Logarithmic message expansion 
Revelation of strategy 
Logarithmic message expansion 
Susceptible to disconnection attacks 
VSS of high overheads 
Costly interactive proof system 
Local verifiability 
Logarithmic message expansion 
Susceptible to disconnection attacks 
Local verifiability 
Our research emphasises on efficiency, robustness and gameplay functionality as a solution to 
the problems identified in the previous subsection: 
• DL cryptosystem: Contrary to conventional reliance on the difficulty of integer factorisation 
(IF) (or the determination of rth residuosity) for security (Shamir et at., 1979; Goldwasser & 
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Micali, 1982; Crepeau, 1986, 1987; Kurosawa er al., 1990, 1997; Schindel hauer, 1998), we 
build our framework upon the equivalently secure DL cryptography; its major attractiveness 
being facilitation of straightforward portability to an elliptic curve (EC) DL (Miller, 1986; 
Koblitz, 1987) basis which allows more compact storage and faster computation . 
. , 
VSS on decryption key: We also depart from Kurosawa et al. (1997) formulation in our 
limited use of VSS only on the decryption key. Thus, instead of dealing (with respect to 
generation, distribution and storage) with a handful of card-dependant secret-shares each 
time a card is in play, player only needs to handle one single key-share, generated and 
distributed at setup stage, thereby resulting in substantial overhead reduction while., still 
providing robustness against collusion and disconnection. 
• Shuffling based on PN: Our shuffling mechanism (Soo & Samsudin, 2002; Soo et aI., 2002) 
follows Kurosawa et al. (1997) in their use of robust verifiable mix-net, but adopts mix-net 
based on PN constructions (Abe, 1999; lakobsson & luels 1999; Abe & Hoshino, 2001) that 
are more appropriate for small input size (like a deck of cards). However, instead of relying 
on Benes PN (Benes, 1965; Waksman, 1968)-the constituent element of the mix-nets-
which rigidly requires the input size to be a power of 2, we employ an optimised PN that 
can accommodate arbitrary number of'input in conjunction with Abe (1999) structural 
optimisation and lakobsson-luels (1999) efficient correctness proofs. 
• Attribute-based card representation: To support operation such as partial information 
disclosure, we extend Schindelhauer (1998) data structure to an attribute-based card 
representation in which each attribute can be individually disclosed without complete card 
exposure or transfer of card ownership. This is essentially a cryptographically enabled card 
pee/ .... ing operation, and is rendered secure and verifiable via polynomial-based VSS 
(Feldman, 1987). 
-t 
i; 
". 
t 
~. 
• 
Non-interactive ZKPs: The three-move ZKP (the commit-challenge-response protocol) of 
Goldwasser et al. (1985) used in Kurosawa et al. (1997) can be collapsed into one single 
move based on the Fiat-Shamir (1986) technique to output a transitive proof transcript. This 
would also enable offline correctness verification, contributing to a much lower round 
complexity, as well as public verifiability. 
f 1.3.3 
r" 
Methodology 
This thesis therefore demonstrates the construction of a mental card gaming framework via 
integration with the following building blocks or cryptographic constructs: 
• EIGamal (1985) cryptosystem: a discrete logarithmic encryption scheme to ensure 
confidentiality of cards, particularly to provide indistinguishability of facedown cards. It 
also accommodates secret exchange of information between players. Its probabilistic nature 
is most desirable given the small message space of card game (for example 52 cards) and its 
homomorphic property supports randomisation of ciphertexts, allowing action hiding. 
• Pedersen (1991a) distributed key generation (DKG) protocol: enables formulation of 
EIGamaI key-pair by all players distributively. As the joint private key is unknown to any 
player, decryption therefore requires the collaboration of a subset of honest players. The 
generation of key-pair and the decryption process are publicly verifiable based on Feldman 
(1987) VSS technique. It should be noted that the DKG protocol are executed once per 
gaming session (during the setup stage) and thereafter the joint private key remains obscure, 
even during decryption; the cards are recovered via a combination of decryption shares 
instead of using the decryption key. 
• Mix-nets based on PN: for efficient shuffling of cards, in which our mix-net construct or 
shuffling mechanism (Soo & Samsudin. 2002; Soo et al.. 2002) capitaiises on: . 
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Chang and Me/ham (1997) AS PN: for support of arbitrary deck sizes. We further scale 
down the number of switches required based on Waksman (1968) to reduce 
computation; the resultant optimised AS (OAS) PN is the fundamental component of 
our mix-net. 
- Abe (1999) mix-net: for structural optimisation. Up to t cheaters among 1] players can be 
tolerated by employing minimally t + 1 PNs, whereby each player will be assigned 
some columns or stages of the networks, rather than working on a whole PN 
indi vi duall y. 
- Jakobsson and Juels (1999) millimix: for compute-efficient correctness proofs that 
operate on a per switch basis. 
• Feldman (1987) VSS: provides the commitment and verification mechanisms for linkage-
via (n, n)-SS ofShamir (1979)-ofa card with its attributes. In this case, the card being the 
secret is only recoverable if all attributes are known. Nevertheless, each attribute is 
verifiable to be related to a card and hence its correctness. 
• Fiat and Shamir (1986) proof technique: facilitates transformation of an interactive ZKP 
into its non-interactive version without jeopardising the security of the original proof (Feige 
& Shamir, 1990). In a nutshell, the trick is to transform the interactive challenges into 
hashed values of multiple commitments, so as to enable offline verification. In our scheme, 
this is applied into the proofs of Chaum-Pedersen (1992) for equality of DL and variants of 
Schnorr (1991) signature scheme for equivalence of plaintexts. 
1.3.4 Contributions 
This thesis makes several contributions to mental card gaming particularly pertaining to 
efficiency and gameplay extensibility, which can be measured along these dimensions: 
II 
• 
}.Iental card gamingji'amework: We have formulated a secure gaming framework based on 
the hardness of DL Problem (DLP), which security level is comparable to the IF problem 
(IFP). Furthennore, DLP can be defined over an EC group, which is more difficult to solve 
than over a residue class ring. Cryptosystem based on EC is therefore believed to be more 
secure, with significantly reduced computing, storage and bandwidth overheads. 
Card data structure: We have designed a meaningful data structure for cards-a binary 
., . 
. ~-
string composed of each card attribute's bits-adaptable to different card games, with fine-
grained infonnation disclosure is also possible. 
• Gaming operation: We have introduced physically impossible gameplay of card peeking 
operation using our attribute-based cards. The correctness and verifiability of the operation 
is underpinned by Shamir (1979) SS techniques. Such limited information disclosure would, 
for instance, provide for poker gameplay impossible with physical cards via controlled and 
nuanced ambiguity with respect to possession of an ordinary, straight or royal flush. 
• Shuffling efficiency: We have reduced the costs-with respect to computation, 
communication and storage overheads-for card shuffling, which is rendered efficient via 
gameplay-flexible AS PNs with optimisation based on Waksman (1968) and incorporation 
of the most attractive features of Abe (1999) and lakobsson-luels (1999) formulations. 
• Gameplay fairness: We have ensured fair playing and the correctness of gaming outcome 
with the provability-via efficient ZKP and VSS methods-{)f every important game step. 
This eliminates the need to reveal cards, which would expose a player's strategy, at the end 
of the game. Verifiability is universally available as long as the communication channel is 
publicly accessible. 
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• 
Game management: We have outlined robust protocols, catering for overall game 
management, particularly concerning player's participation and withdrawal, supporting 
flexible tradeoffs between collusion resistance and accommodation of dropouts. 
Implementation feasibility: We have considered the resources requirement and tradeoffs for 
viable implementation. In particular, we avoid unnecessary cumbersome interaction by 
using non-interactive proving techniques in ZKPs and VSS, although we have to bear with 
an increased bit size for the challenge (hash function) to preclude offline attacks. 
Nevertheless, non-interactivity saves on computation and communication, and is therefore 
well-suited for online gaming, mobile gaming or other lightweight platforms. 
1.4 Thesis Organisation 
The rest of this thesis is organised as follows: 
Chapter 2 gives the essential cryptographic background for comprehension and appreciation of 
mental card gaming; some of these basic primitives or protocols are building blocks for the 
construction of our solution. There are four main concepts discussed: public-key (PK) 
cryptosystems, threshold cryptography, ZKf and mix-nets. The chapter also contains some 
definitions and notational conventions used in the technical part of this thesis. 
Chapter 3 discusses existing schemes, beginning with a brief review of the literature related to 
mental gaming, which is intended as an overview of the area. We then focus on four noteworthy 
schemes: Shamir et al. (1979) being the first mental poker protocol, Crepeau (1987) as deemed 
complete for mental poker, Kurosawa et al. (1997) with its introduction of gameplay robustness 
and Schindelhauer (1998) for having an innovational card representation. For each scheme, we 
present its models and the cryptographic building blocks used. Some significant card operations 
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are outlined next, followed by a high-level analysis of the scheme. The chapter concludes with a 
summary of our findings and a discussion of insights gained. 
> ,,~. F Chapter 4 synthesises ideas from the previous two chapters to construct mental card gaming 
~ ~ 
tprotocols supportive of gameplay versatility, robustness and efficiency. We detail a few 
~, 
ffundamental card operations: shuffling cards, drawing a card, giving a card and disclosing card-
fattribute, the last of which fully demonstrates the flexibility of our attribute-based card 
[ representation. Our innovation of mix-net underpinning shuffling operation (Soo & Samsudin, 
.2002; Soo et ai., 2002) is carefully delineated, which incorporates our optimisation of Chang-
Melham (1997) AS PN, Abe (1999) mix-net architecture and Jakobsson-Juels (1999) 
correctness verification. 
Chapter 5 presents rigorous proofs that the properties claimed, namely privacy, fairness, 
robustness and verifiability, are attained accordingly. We also provide an analysis of the 
required complexity and compare the performance with existing scheme, Kurosawa et al. (1997) 
in particular. Finally, Chapter 6 concludes the thesis, reflects on our contributions, and proposes 
directions for future research work. 
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l. 
" I Chapter 2 
"CRYPTOGRAPHIC BACKGROUND 
2.1 Introduction 
: In this chapter, we discuss some cryptographic protocols necessary for the understanding of 
C mental card gaming, which at the same time are also useful as building blocks for the 
I construction of our proposed scheme. This review 'also serves as a means of introducing 
l' notations. We begin with some PK encryption schemes, which provide ~rivacy an~ security for 
the gaming protocols. We then look at threshold cryptography, a tool for supporting distributed 
trust among mutually suspicious card players, and the notion of ZKP as one of the anti-fraud 
mechanisms. We also discuss the application of PN-based mix-nets with respect to card 
shuffling. Lastly, we conclude the chapter with a discussion on the relation of these tools with 
our proposed scheme. 
2.2 Public-Key Cryptosystern 
Encryption is fundamental in mental card gaming to ensure privacy, which is much needed, 
especially in the representation for the backs of cards to support their indistinguishability, and in 
exchanging cards operation between players. PK cryptosystem-first identified by Diffie and 
Hellman (1976)-involves different keys for encryption and decryption. Let K be the key space 
and k E K, we denote Ek(rn, .) and Dk(m, .) the encryption-decryption transformations on 
plaintext rn using the public and private keys; it is infeasible to compute the latter from the 
former. 
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For implementation of mental gaming protocols, a few properties are desired from the 
JIlderlying PK encryption scheme, considering the small message space of the playing cards. 
[.et R be the randomisation set, M and C the plaintext and ciphertext spaces respectively. 
Probabilistic encryption: This notion was invented by Goldwasser and Micali (1982), with 
the encryption function given by Ek: M x R ~ C while decryption is Dk: C ~ M, such that 
Dk(Ek(m, r)) = m for 'rim EM, r E R. 
Decryption only requires that Ek be partially invertible as the recovery of the random 
number is not necessary. Thus, for large R, a plaintext may have many--exponential in the 
security parameter-different ciphertexts. 
Semantic security: It is infeasible for a passive adversary with polynomially bounded 
computing power to obtain partial information about the plaintext from the ciphertext; and 
the encryptions of an arbitrary (known) pair of messages is indistinguishable (Yao, 1982; 
Goldwasser & Micali, 1984; Micali et al., 1988). 
~ £(mh r,) ® E(m2' r2) = £(m, + m2, ro) for some ro; 
that is, the decryption of a sum of ciphers is the sum of the corresponding plaintexts. This 
algebraic property-discovered by Benaloh (1987)-allows direct operation on 
cryptograms without knowledge of the corresponding decryption functions. 
Randomisability of ciphertext: By depending only on public parameters, a ciphertext can be 
changed, C x R -t C, while preserving the plaintext. Furthermore, the ciphertexts 
c = £(m, r) and c'= £(c, r) are indistinguishable. 
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In the following subsections, we review three PK cryptosystems related to mental card gaming 
that satisfy the requirements above, the last of which is employed in our proposed scheme. 
[ ~; 2.2.1 Goldwasser-Micali Cryptosystem 
~~ 
~; 
~ This scheme by Goldwasser and Micali (1982, 1984) achieves randomness via bitwise 
~. I probabilistic encryption of a message, based on the trapdoor hardcore predicate of QR. We first 
~~ 
~introduce some basic number theoretic backgrounds and notations before defining the 
L 
~ 
~ computational problem: 
• Zn E [0, n), a group under addition modulo n; Z: == {x: gcd(x, n) I, x E Zn}' a 
multiplicative group modulo n. 
• QRn == {z: 3x E Z:, z == x2 mod n}, set of quadratic residue modulo nand QNRn == Z: \ QRn, 
the set of quadratic non-residue modulo n. 
• The Legendre symbol of x mod p where p is a prime and x E Z:' is defined as 
{
+! ifxEOR, 
J (x) = -
p -1 otherwise. 
• Given the prime factorisation of a composite integer n, n = IT=I p:i where Pi are distinct 
primes and ei 2: 1, Jacobi symbol ofx mod n is defined as In(x) = IT=Jp, (x)" . 
The cryptosystem is semantically secure assuming the intractability of QR Problem (QRP): 
Definition 2.1. Let n be an odd composite integer of unknown factorisation and given Z E Z: 
having Jiz) = 1, QRP is to decide whether Z E QR II • 
Goldwasser-Micali scheme has the following properties: 
Private key: two large random prime, p and q 
Public key: n == pq and Y E QNRn with In(v) == I 
Plaintext: M == mlm2 ... 111" a binary string of length I 
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Encryption: C = CIC2.' .Ct where Ci f- ym, x} mod n ; Xi E R Z: (E R denotes uniform random 
selection.) 
{
o ifJp(cj ) = 1, 
Decryption: For i = 1 to" t, mj f- I 
otherwise. 
'The cryptosystem satisfies stringent security requirements. However, its bitwise encryption 
induces logarithmic message expansion, thus hinders its practicality. 
: 2.2.2 Benaloh Cryptosystem 
~"" Exploiting related trapdoor techniques based on the common algebraic setting of high degree 
- residuosity classes, Benaloh (1987,. 1994) presented a generalisation of Goldwasser-Micali 
scheme to allow arbitrary prime r values, thereby enabling wordwise encryption. The 
motivation is to reduce the required bitwise computation via selection of a residue r so as to be 
only slightly larger than any possible plaintexts. Therefore, the size of a plaintext represented by 
a single ciphertext is much larger, reducing the expansion rate. Before proceeding to the 
computational problem, we describe some related backgrounds and notations (Benaloh, 1987): 
• Z: = {z: 3x E Z:, z == xr mod n}, set of /h residue modulo nand Z: = Z: \ Z:, the set of rth 
non-residue modulo n. 
• R:,n.y = {w: w == ySz mod n, WE Z:, Z E Z:}, the set of all elements of residue class s with 
respect to the consonant triplet (r, n, y). [w] denotes the residue class where W is a member 
of R:,n.y for a unique s. 
• A triplet (r, n, y) of integers is consonant if and only if l E Z: ~ s == ° mod r => R~.",!" 
Benaloh cryptosystem attains semantic security assuming the intractability of Prime Residuosity 
Problem (PRP): 
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Definition 2.2. For every prime r, the PRP addresses the determination of rth residuosity modulo 
% or the residue class for random elements in Z:; PRP is computationally difficult when n is a 
:omposite integer of unknown factorisation. 
:t is easy to see that for the minimally simple case of r = 2, PRP is equivalent to QRP (cf. 
iubsection 2.2.1, Definition 2.1). We review Benaloh's cryptosystem as follows: 
Private key: two large random prime, p and q, such that r I p-l, ? ~ p-I and r t q-l 
Public key: n = pq and y E Z: 
Plaintext: ME Zr 
Encryption: C ~ E(M) =/f:Jr mod n, where x ER Z:. Npte that U~~o {£(M)} = Z: .. In fact, 
£(0), ... , E(r - I) forms a partition of Z: . 
Decryption: M = j if C(p-l)(q-I)/r = (y<p-l)(q-I)/r)j modn wherej E Zr 
Based on the fact that ciphertext Z E £(0) if and only if z(p-l)(q-I)/r == I mod n, [CD can be 
decided. For small r, we can perform exhaustive search for the smallest M E Zr such that 
v-M C mod n E £(0). This process can be accelerated by precomputing (y<P-I)(q-I)/r)j modn for 
'l/j E Zr' thus decryption can be a mere look-up process on C(p-I)(q-Il/r modn . This method, 
however, is impractical as r grows due to its OCr) complexity. Hence, for moderate sized r, the 
baby-step giant-step algorithm (Knuth, 1973)-a combination of exhaustive search and table 
look-u~an be applied to lower decryption complexity to O( j;) . 
Obviously, the computational problem of ,-th residuosity has much potential. Zheng et al. (1988, 
\989) presented further generalisation of PRP investigating the case for odd r, which was later 
extended by Kurosawa et al. (1990) for any r. Recent cryptosystems belonging to this family of 
techniques by Naccache and Stern (1997), Okamoto and Uchiyama (1998) and Paillier (\999) 
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achieve even higher efficiency admitting dramatically reduced expansion rate, by exploring 
residuosity of smooth degree over Z:, prime degree p over Z· 2 and composite degree over pq 
. Z' 2 respectively. 
n 
. 2.2.3 EIGamal Cryptosystem 
.. EIGamal (1985) scheme leverages on the hardness of OL in a prime order gr::mp. Nevertheless, 
it can also operate over EC group (Miller, 1986; Koblitz, 1987) to take advantage of the 
f increased speed and reduced key size. The cryptosystem is probabilistic but unlike Goldwasser-
"-r 
Micali and Benaloh cryptosystems, randomisation is added to the whole message instead of at 
bit or byte level. We present some necessary backgrounds and notations to facilitate 
understanding of further discussion: 
• x mod n is said to have order k if k is the smallest positive integer such that Xk == 1 mod 11. 
Similarly, a group generated by x has order k mod n means k is the lowest power of x such 
that Xk == 1 mod n. 
• Given large primes p and q such that q I p - 1, Gq is a unique subgroup of prime order q of 
Z:' if for some generator g, Gq = {gX modp: x E [1, q]} c Z:' 
• In other words, g is a generator of Gq if the powers of g reproduce the subgroup. Since Gq's 
order is prime, every element in Gq\{ I} is a generator. Note that g is of order p - 1. 
EIGamal cryptosystem is semantically secure under the Decision Diffie-Hellman (DOH) 
assumption (Brands, 1993; Boneh, 1998): 
Definition 2.3. Informally, OOH problem for Gq is to distinguish between two distributions 
a h "n d a h C h b "" DOH . . . ~ 'b'l' <g ,g ,g > an <g, g , g > were a, ,C E R £,,; assumptIOn states Its mleaSI I Ity. 
For a typical setting, we let q = 2p + I, As the QR of any given x mod p can be computed easily, 
thereby gaining one bit of information, we set G" = QRp in Z: to eliminate such information 
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kakage. EIGamal cryptosystem is shown as follows, with p, q and g considered as system 
parameters: 
Private key: x E R Zq 
Public key: y = t mod p 
Plaintext: ME Gq • Note that Me Gq can be mapped onto Gq via manipulation of Jp • 
Encryption: C= (a, b) = (Mya, gj for some aE R Zq 
Decryption: M = a/ bX 
Its multiplicative homomorphic property, E(M1) ® E(M2) = E(M j M2), allows for plaintext-
preserving random re-encryption of a ciphertext C = (a, b) via computation" of l;' ~ (a, b) ® 
(a',b) where (a:b)=E(l) = (;I, fI> with f3 ER Zq. The correlation, or the plaintext 
equivalence of C and C'is denoted as C == c: 
2.3 Threshold Cryptography 
The idea of threshold cryptography in mental gaming is motivated by the standard presumption 
of player distrust and untrustworthiness, necessitating distribution of trust among the players to 
protect information or computation. It is, however, reasonable to presume a majority of honest 
players in which the integrity of gameplay can be derived from. The fundamental ingredient of 
threshold cryptography is SS (Blakley, 1979; Shamir, 1979), particularly VSS (Benaloh, 1986, 
1987 ; Feldman, 1987; Pedersen, 1991 b). However, these threshold schemes (which will be 
outlined in subsections 2.3. I and 2.3.2) usually involve a TTP for secret generation and 
recovery, with consequence risk of single point of failure. 
To preclude this problem, threshold cryptosystems, the non-trivial extension of threshold 
schemes, avoid the use of TTP. The main component of a threshold cryptosystem is DKG (such 
as Pedersen, 1991 a; Canetti et al., 1999; Gennaro et a/., 1999; Jarecki & Lysyanskaya, 2000 for 
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DL-based cryptosystems), with application to threshold signature or decryption protocols; the 
fault-tolerant distribution is defined by the underlying PK cryptosystem. As computation, 
storage and reconstruction of the secret key are not performed at a single location, 
confidentiality and availability are assured in the presence of malicious attacks or local 
. computer failure. We discuss DKG in subsection 2.3.3 and threshold decryption, which 
2.3.1 Threshold Secret Sharing 
(t, n)-threshold SS (t ::; n) addresses the division of a secret into n shares such that any subset of 
.. -I shares equal to or exceeding configutable size t (the threshold) enables secret recQn~truction, 
Ii'· ~'- while t - 1 or fewer discloses no information on the secret. Shamir's (1979) formulation of this 
notion is based on polynomial interpolation, which is the unambiguous parameterisation of (t-
I)-degree polynomial fix), which can succeed only if t distinct coordinate points (Xi, j(x,) are 
available. This allows secret definition using the polynomial intercept j(0). The scheme is 
outlined below: 
• Secret Distribution: Shares related to secret S E Z p' where p is a prime chosen by the 
dealer, is distributed to the participants. The dealer first defines a (t - I)-degree polynomial 
I(X) = I.:~oakxk over Zp withj(O) = ao = S and other coefficients, a~1 ER Zp randomly 
generated. Each secret-share is a point on j(x), that is, (Xi, j{Xi» with Xi '" 0, which is 
subsequently dealt to the shareholders via a private channel. 
• Secret Recovery: This requires possession of at least t distinct points (Xi,j{X;». The encoding 
polynomial can be computed via Lagrange interpolation 
I(x) = ""t_ I(XJ)(nk' _ k ' X-Xk ) thereby enabling disclosure ofj{O) = S. L.,J-I -I. ~JXj-Xk 
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1. Secret Distribution 
Figure 2.1: Threshold secret sharing scheme 
: Shamir threshold scheme is perfect since collaboration of at most t - 1 shareholders has no 
: advantage in guessing the secret over an outsider. However, a misbehaving dealer can give 
~; incorrect shares to sabotage secret reconstruction. The solution to this problem lies in VSS. 
2.3.2 Verifiable Secret Sharing 
VSS, first introduced by Chor et al. (1985), to ensure meaningfulness of the shares without 
revealing them, achieving SS in the presence of malicious dealer. Benaloh (1986, 1987) later 
observed that Shamir's threshold scheme have (+, +)-homomorphic property-any linear 
combination of secret-shares is itself a share of the linear combination of secrets. So, if t secrets 
S are decomposed into shares s, 
S, ~ Su, ... , s'.1] 
St ~ St.!. ... , St. 1] 
then '" { Sj f- "': Sj p" " '" ~ Sj I . L.t,=1 .LJ,=I, L.",=l. 
This facilitates a simpler mechanism for VSS as computation can be performed on secret-shares 
without the need to construct the secret. 
The basic idea for VSS is to have the potentially untrustworthy dealer commits to the SS 
polynomial-where the free term defines the secret S-by committing the coefficients using a 
function that is probabilistic and homomorphic, which can be any of the schemes discussed in 
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section 2.2. Due to the homomorphic properties, the verification function will convince the 
shareholders that their shares lie on a polynomial of degree t - 1, thus identify a unique secret. 
i 3. Share Verification 
1. Secret Distribution ? 
IT t-! A,' £( ) I ( ) - "t-1 k. Z }' k=O k = S, X - ,i...,k=Oakx ,ak E I' , 
S=/(O)~ t ~ _ _ ! ~ 4. Secret Recovery G s = l(i) mod P ill' ------. , .~ .·'-G 't I (x,.!(x,)l"«.,,)_ ~ 
2. sec,..~ Comm;!ment 1 .ll' ~ 
Ak-£(ak ) 
Figure 2.2: Verifiable secret sharing scheme 
- We are interested in non-interactive VSS schemes for its communication efficiency. We outline 
two different flavours of non-interactive VSS techniques: Feldman (1987), which is based on 
the hardness of computing DL over Z p and Benaloh (1994) which relies on the intractability of 
/h residuosity problem (or the factorisation of an RSA (Rivest et al., 1978) modulus). 
Feldman- VSS 
The solution assumes SS polynomial f(x) = 2::~>k.l over Zq with the secret distribution 
phase similar to Shamir's SS scheme (cf. subsection 2.2.3). To check for a consistent dealing, 
the commitment and verification procedures employ the use of DL-based probabilistic 
homomorphic encryption scheme, such as EIGamal (cf. subsection 2.2.3): 
• Secret Commitment: The dealer broadcast public values Ak = ga, mod p for k = 0, ... , t - I. 
'! I-I .t 
• Share Verification: Shareholder computes g!(Xi) = ITk=O A/i , exploiting the homomorphic 
properties of the exponentiation function, gag! = gaP. 
Note that the value gao mod p is revealed. Thus, the semantic security can only be stated on the 
computational assumption of gaO (the intractability of DL problem), Pedersen ( 1991 b) presented 
24 
